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The New Paradigm of ‘Substantive Marketing’ for Innovative ITThis decade has clearly marked a sea change in the move of enterprise software from proprietary to open source, as I have recently discussed [1]. It is instructive that only a mere six years ago I was in heated fights with my then Board about open source; today, that seems so quaint and dated.![World's Tallest Flagpole; see ref [9]](../wp-content/themes/ai3/images/2011Posts/110815_tallest_flagpole.jpg "World's Tallest Flagpole; see ref [9]")
Also during this period many have noted how open source has changed the capital required to begin a new software startup [2]. Open source both provides the tooling and the components for cobbling together specialty apps and extensions. Six and seven and even eight figure startup costs common just a decade ago have now dropped to four or five figures. When we see the explosion of hundreds of thousands of smartphone apps we are seeing the glowing residue of these additional sea changes. Dropping startup costs by one to three orders of magnitude is truly democratizing innovation.
But something else has been going on that is changing the face of enterprise software (besides consolidation, another factor I also recently commented on). And that factor is “marketing”. Much less commentary is made about this change, but it, too, is greatly lowering costs and fundamentally changing market penetration strategies. That topic — and my personal experience with it — is the focus of this article.
This Friday brown bag leftover was first placed into the AI3 refrigerator on August 15, 2011. This reprise is unchanged from its original posting and still describes how Structured Dynamics undertakes its marketing.Besides the few remaining big providers of enterprise software — like IBM, Oracle, HP, SAP — most vendors have totally remade their sales practices of just a few years ago. Large sales forces with big commissions and a year to two year sales cycles can no longer be justified when software license fees and the percentage maintenance annuities that flow from them are dropping rapidly. Today’s mantras are doing more with less and doing it faster, hardly consistent with the traditional enterprise software model. Sure, big enterprises, especially big government and big business, have large sunk costs in legacy systems that will continue to be milked by existing vendors. But the flow is constricting with longer-term trends clear to see. The old enterprise software model is obsolete.
Even if it were not dying, it is hard to square huge investments in sales and marketing when product development has become inexpensive and agile. The proliferation of three-letter marketing acronyms for branding “new” product areas and standard formulas for product hype of just a few years ago also feels old and dated. Cozy relationships with conventional trade press pundits and market analysts seem to be diminishing in importance, possibly because the authoritativeness of their influence is also diminishing. It is harder to justify market firm subscription costs when priority budget items are being cut and new information outlets have emerged.
In response to this, many developers have forsaken the enterprise market for the consumer one. Indeed enterprises themselves are looking more and more to the consumer sector and commodity apps for innovation and answers. But, still, problems unique to enterprises remain and how to effectively reach them in this brave new world is today’s marketing problem for enterprise software vendors.
Most entities today, when opining about these challenges, tend to emphasize the need for “laser focus” and “rifle-shot” targeting of prospects. The advice takes the form of: 1) emphasize well-defined verticals; 2) know your market well; and 3) target and go after your likely prospects. Prospect data mining and targeted ad analysis are the proferred elixirs.
But, there is little evidence such refined methods for prospect identification and targeting are really working. Like politicians doing focus groups and opinion polling to capture the desired “message” of their potential electorates, these are all still “push” models of marketing. Yet we are swamped with pushed messages and marketing everywhere we turn. The model is failing.
Besides message overload, there are two issues with laser targeting. First, despite all that we try to know about ready buyers (for enterprise software), we really don’t know if any particular individual is truly needful, in a position to buy, has the authority to buy, or is the right advocate to make the internal sell. Second, though the idea of “laser” carries with it the image of focus and not flailing, it is in fact expensive to identify the targets and send a focused message their way. Because of these issues, decay rates for laser prospects throughout conventional sales pipelines continue to rise.
There has always been the phenomenon of the “fish jumping into the boat“; that is, the unanticipated inbound inquiry from a previously unknown prospect leading to a surprisingly swift sale. But we have seen this phenomenon increase markedly in recent years. Structured Dynamics‘ current customer base — including recurring customers — comes almost exclusively from this source. As we have noted this trend in comparison with more targeted outreach, we have spent much time trying to understand why it is occurring and how we can leverage what Peter Drucker called the “unexpected success” [3].
What we are seeing, I believe, is a shift from sales to marketing, and within marketing from direct or outbound marketing to a new paradigm of marketing. Others have likened this to inbound marketing [4] or content marketing [5] or permission marketing [6]. What we are seeing at Structured Dynamics bears many resemblances to parts of what is claimed for these other approaches, but not all. And, it is also true that what we are seeing may pertain mostly to innovative IT for emerging enterprise markets, and not a generalized paradigm suitable to other products or markets.
For lack of a better term, what we are seeing we can term “substantive marketing”. By this we mean offering valuable content and solutions-oriented systems for free and without restriction. This shares aspects with content marketing. Then, in keeping with the trend for buyers doing their own research and analysis to fulfill their own needs, similar to the premises of inbound or permission marketing, potential consumers can make their own judgments as to relevance and value of our offerings.
Sometimes, of course, some prospects find our approaches and solutions lacking. Sometimes, they may grab what we have offered for free and use them on their own without compensation to us. But where the match is right — and we need to be honest with both ourselves and the customer when it is not — we can better spend the customer’s limited time and resources to tailor our generic solutions to their specific needs. In doing so, we offer higher value (tailored services) while learning better about another spectrum of consumer need that can virtuously enhance our substantive offerings for the next prospect.
So, let’s decompose these components further to see what they can tell us about this new practice of substantive marketing and how to use it as an engine for moving forward.
The premise of substantive marketing is to offer square-deal value to the marketplace in the form of solutions-based content. Like content marketing that offers “the creation or sharing of content for the purpose of engaging current and potential consumer bases” [5], substantive marketing goes even further. The whole basis and premise of the approach is to provide substantive content, in one of more of these areas, preferably all:
Further, this substantive content is offered without strings, restrictions or customer fill-in forms. The content is not a come on or a teaser. We are not trying to gather leads or prospect names, because we have no intent to dun them with emails or follow-ups.
This substantive content is as complete as can be to enable new users to adopt the information and tools in their current state without further assistance. (In some cases, the information also educates the marketplace in order to prepare future customers for adoption.) Most importantly, this substantive content is offered for free, either open source (for code) or creative commons for documentation and other content. In return, it is fair to request — and we do — attribution when this material is used.
We have previously termed this complete panoply of substantive content a total open solution [7]. Some might find the provision of such robust information crazy: How can we give away the store of our proprietary knowledge and systems?
But we find this kind of thinking old school. In an open source world where so much information is now available online, with a bit of effort customers can find this information anyway. Rather, our mindset is that customers do not want to pay again for what has already been done, but are willing to pay for what can be done with that knowledge for their own specific problems. Offering the complete storehouse of our knowledge in fact signals our interest in only charging the customer for new answers, new value or new formulations. The customers we like to work with feel they are getting an honest, square deal.
Consider your substantive content to be your flag, a unique banner for conveying and packaging your specific brand. It is thus important to find appropriate flagpoles — in the virtual territories that your customers visit — for raising this content high for them to see. Since the role of these flagpoles is to create awareness in potential prospects — who you do not likely know individually or even by group in advance — it makes sense to raise your offerings up on many flagpoles and on the highest flagpoles. Visibility is the object of the approach.
This approach is distinctly not leafletting or cramming links or emails into as many spaces as possible. The idea of substantive marketing is to fly valuable content high enough that desirous potential customers can discover and then inspect the information on their own, and only if they so choose. In this regard, substantive marketing resembles permission marketing [6].
Being visible helps ensure that the needful, questing prospect that you would never have been able to target on your own is able to see and be aware of your offerings. And, since they are seeking information and answers, your collateral needs to be of a similar nature. Solutions and substance are what they are seeking; what you have run up the flagpole should respond to that.
The mindset here is to respect your prospective customers and to allow them to chose to receive and inspect your offerings, but only if they so choose. If flown in the right venues with the right visibility, customers will see your flags and inspect them if they meet their requirements.
Some of the venues at which you can raise your flags include:
The observant reader will have already concluded that each of these venues develops slowly, and therefore raising visibility is generally a slow-and-steady game that requires patience. Start-up vendors backed by venture firms or those looking for quick visibility and cashout will not find this approach suitable. On the other hand, customer prospects looking for answers and self-sustaining solutions are not much interested in flash in the pan vendors, either.
The real drivers for this changing paradigm come from customer prospects. Sophisticated buyers of enterprise IT and instrumental change agents within organizations share most if not all of these characteristics:
More often than not we find our customers to have already installed and used our existing substantive materials for some time before they approach us about further work. They appreciate the tutorial information and have taught themselves much in advance. By the time we engage, both parties are able to cost-effectively focus on what is truly missing and needed and to deliver those answers in a quick way. Re-engagements tend to occur when a next set of gaps or challenges arise.
Though it may sound trite or even unbelievable to those who have not yet experienced such a relationship, the square deal value offered by substantive marketing can really lead to true partnerships and trust between vendor and customer. We experience it daily with our customers, and vice versa. We also think this is the adaptive approach that our new environment demands.
Once prospects learn of our substantive offerings, many may decide independently that what we have is not suitable. Others may simply download and use the information on their own, for which we often never know let alone receive revenue. We are completely fine with this, as shown for three different cases.
First, some of these prospects need no more than what we already have. This increases our user base, increases our visibility and often results in contributions to our forums and documentation.
Then, some of these prospects come to learn they need or want more than what our current offerings provide, leading to two possible forks. In one fork, the second case, they may have sufficient skills internally or with other suppliers to extend the system on their own. Some of this flows back to an improved code base or improved installation or documentation bases.
In the other fork, the third case, they may decide to engage us in tailoring a solution for them. That case is the only one of the three that leads to a direct revenue path.
In all three cases we win, and the customer wins. Maybe enterprise software vendors of decades past rue this reality of lower margins and shared benefits; we agree that the absolute profit potential of substantive marketing is much less. But we gladly accept the more enjoyable work and steady revenue relationships resulting from these changes. We are not engaged in some pollyann-ish altruism here, but in a steely-eyed honest brokering that best serves our own self-interest (and fairly that of the customer, as well).
Great IT product does not come from idle musings or dreamed up functionality. It comes solely and directly from solving customer problems. Only via customers can software be refined and made more broadly usable.
A slipstream of those who have previously become aware and tested our offerings will choose to engage our services. This generally takes the form of an inbound call, where the prospect not only qualifies itself, but also establishes the terms and conditions for the sale. They have chosen to select us; they are fish that have jumped into the boat.
To again quote Peter Drucker, “. . . the aim of marketing is to make selling superfluous. The aim of marketing is to know and understand the customer so well that the product or service fits him and sells itself. Ideally, marketing should result in a customer who is ready to buy. All that should be needed then is to make the product or service available . . .” [8]. This is precisely what I meant earlier about the shift in emphasis from sales to marketing.
Even at this point there may be mismatches in needs and our skills and availabilities. If such is the case, we do not hesitate to say so, and attempt to point the prospect in another direction (from which we also gain invaluable market knowledge). If there is indeed a match, we then proceed to try to find common ground on schedule and budget.
Paradoxically, this square deal and honesty about the readiness and weaknesses of our offerings often leads to forgiveness from our customers. For example, for some time we have lacked automated installation scripts that would make it easier for prospects to install our open semantic framework. But, because of compensating value in other areas, such gaps can be overlooked and tackled later on (indeed, as a current customer is now funding). By not pretending to be everything to everyone, we can offer what we do have without embarrassment and get on with the job of solving problems.
For larger potential engagements, we typically suggest a fixed price initial effort to develop an implementation plan. The interviews and research to support this typical 4- to 6-weeks effort (generally in the $5 K to $10 K range, depending) then result in a detailed fulfillment proposal, with firm tasks, budget and schedule, specific to that customer’s requirements. Just as we respect our prospects’ time and budget, we expect the same and do not conduct these detailed plans without compensation. With respect to fulfillment contracts, we cap contract amount and limit milestone payments to pre-set percentages or time expended, whichever is lower.
This approach ensures we understand the customer’s needs and have budgeted and tasked accordingly. Capped contracts also put the onus on us the contractor to understand our own effort and tasking structures and realities, which leads to better future estimating. For the customer, this approach caps risk and potential exposure, and ensures milestones are being met no matter the time expenditures by us, the contractor. This approach extends our square-deal basis to also embrace risks and payments.
Thus, when customers engage us, they spend almost solely on new functionality specifically tailored to their needs. In doing so, we suggest they agree to release the new developments they fund as open source. We argue — and customers predominantly agree — that they are already benefitting from lower overall costs because other customers have funded sharable, open source before them. We point out that the new customers that follow them will also be independently creating new functionality, to which they will also later benefit.
(This argument does not apply to specific customer data or ontologies, which are naturally proprietary to the customer. Also, if the customer wants to retain intellectual ownership of extensions, we charge higher development fees.)
Once these new developments are completed, they are fed back into a new baseline of valuable content and code. From this new baseline the cycle of substantive marketing can be augmented anew and perpetuated.
All of these points can really be boiled down to three guidelines for how to make substantive marketing effective:
What we are finding — as we continue to refine our understanding of this new paradigm — is that through substantive marketing the fish are finding us and they sometimes jump into the boat. We like our enterprise customers to pre-qualify themselves and already be “sold” once they knock on the door. One never knows when that phone might ring or the email might come in. But when it does, it often results in a collaborative customer as a partner who is a joy to work with to solve exciting new problems.
The New Paradigm of ‘Substantive Marketing’ for Innovative ITThis decade has clearly marked a sea change in the move of enterprise software from proprietary to open source, as I have recently discussed [1]. It is instructive that only a mere six years ago I was in heated fights with my then Board about open source; today, that seems so quaint and dated.
Also during this period many have noted how open source has changed the capital required to begin a new software startup [2]. Open source both provides the tooling and the components for cobbling together specialty apps and extensions. Six and seven and even eight figure startup costs common just a decade ago have now dropped to four or five figures. When we see the explosion of hundreds of thousands of smartphone apps we are seeing the glowing residue of these additional sea changes. Dropping startup costs by one to three orders of magnitude is truly democratizing innovation.
But something else has been going on that is changing the face of enterprise software (besides consolidation, another factor I also recently commented on). And that factor is “marketing”. Much less commentary is made about this change, but it, too, is greatly lowering costs and fundamentally changing market penetration strategies. That topic — and my personal experience with it — is the focus of this article.
Besides the few remaining big providers of enterprise software — like IBM, Oracle, HP, SAP — most vendors have totally remade their sales practices of just a few years ago. Large sales forces with big commissions and a year to two year sales cycles can no longer be justified when software license fees and the percentage maintenance annuities that flow from them are dropping rapidly. Today’s mantras are doing more with less and doing it faster, hardly consistent with the traditional enterprise software model. Sure, big enterprises, especially big government and big business, have large sunk costs in legacy systems that will continue to be milked by existing vendors. But the flow is constricting with longer-term trends clear to see. The old enterprise software model is obsolete.
Even if it were not dying, it is hard to square huge investments in sales and marketing when product development has become inexpensive and agile. The proliferation of three-letter marketing acronyms for branding “new” product areas and standard formulas for product hype of just a few years ago also feels old and dated. Cozy relationships with conventional trade press pundits and market analysts seem to be diminishing in importance, possibly because the authoritativeness of their influence is also diminishing. It is harder to justify market firm subscription costs when priority budget items are being cut and new information outlets have emerged.
In response to this, many developers have forsaken the enterprise market for the consumer one. Indeed enterprises themselves are looking more and more to the consumer sector and commodity apps for innovation and answers. But, still, problems unique to enterprises remain and how to effectively reach them in this brave new world is today’s marketing problem for enterprise software vendors.
Most entities today, when opining about these challenges, tend to emphasize the need for “laser focus” and “rifle-shot” targeting of prospects. The advice takes the form of: 1) emphasize well-defined verticals; 2) know your market well; and 3) target and go after your likely prospects. Prospect data mining and targeted ad analysis are the proferred elixirs.
But, there is little evidence such refined methods for prospect identification and targeting are really working. Like politicians doing focus groups and opinion polling to capture the desired “message” of their potential electorates, these are all still “push” models of marketing. Yet we are swamped with pushed messages and marketing everywhere we turn. The model is failing.
Besides message overload, there are two issues with laser targeting. First, despite all that we try to know about ready buyers (for enterprise software), we really don’t know if any particular individual is truly needful, in a position to buy, has the authority to buy, or is the right advocate to make the internal sell. Second, though the idea of “laser” carries with it the image of focus and not flailing, it is in fact expensive to identify the targets and send a focused message their way. Because of these issues, decay rates for laser prospects throughout conventional sales pipelines continue to rise.
There has always been the phenomenon of the “fish jumping into the boat“; that is, the unanticipated inbound inquiry from a previously unknown prospect leading to a surprisingly swift sale. But we have seen this phenomenon increase markedly in recent years. Structured Dynamics‘ current customer base — including recurring customers — comes almost exclusively from this source. As we have noted this trend in comparison with more targeted outreach, we have spent much time trying to understand why it is occurring and how we can leverage what Peter Drucker called the “unexpected success” [3].
What we are seeing, I believe, is a shift from sales to marketing, and within marketing from direct or outbound marketing to a new paradigm of marketing. Others have likened this to inbound marketing [4] or content marketing [5] or permission marketing [6]. What we are seeing at Structured Dynamics bears many resemblances to parts of what is claimed for these other approaches, but not all. And, it is also true that what we are seeing may pertain mostly to innovative IT for emerging enterprise markets, and not a generalized paradigm suitable to other products or markets.
For lack of a better term, what we are seeing we can term “substantive marketing”. By this we mean offering valuable content and solutions-oriented systems for free and without restriction. This shares aspects with content marketing. Then, in keeping with the trend for buyers doing their own research and analysis to fulfill their own needs, similar to the premises of inbound or permission marketing, potential consumers can make their own judgments as to relevance and value of our offerings.
Sometimes, of course, some prospects find our approaches and solutions lacking. Sometimes, they may grab what we have offered for free and use them on their own without compensation to us. But where the match is right — and we need to be honest with both ourselves and the customer when it is not — we can better spend the customer’s limited time and resources to tailor our generic solutions to their specific needs. In doing so, we offer higher value (tailored services) while learning better about another spectrum of consumer need that can virtuously enhance our substantive offerings for the next prospect.
So, let’s decompose these components further to see what they can tell us about this new practice of substantive marketing and how to use it as an engine for moving forward.
The premise of substantive marketing is to offer square-deal value to the marketplace in the form of solutions-based content. Like content marketing that offers “the creation or sharing of content for the purpose of engaging current and potential consumer bases” [5], substantive marketing goes even further. The whole basis and premise of the approach is to provide substantive content, in one of more of these areas, preferably all:
Further, this substantive content is offered without strings, restrictions or customer fill-in forms. The content is not a come on or a teaser. We are not trying to gather leads or prospect names, because we have no intent to dun them with emails or follow-ups.
This substantive content is as complete as can be to enable new users to adopt the information and tools in their current state without further assistance. (In some cases, the information also educates the marketplace in order to prepare future customers for adoption.) Most importantly, this substantive content is offered for free, either open source (for code) or creative commons for documentation and other content. In return, it is fair to request — and we do — attribution when this material is used.
We have previously termed this complete panoply of substantive content a total open solution [7]. Some might find the provision of such robust information crazy: How can we give away the store of our proprietary knowledge and systems?
But we find this kind of thinking old school. In an open source world where so much information is now available online, with a bit of effort customers can find this information anyway. Rather, our mindset is that customers do not want to pay again for what has already been done, but are willing to pay for what can be done with that knowledge for their own specific problems. Offering the complete storehouse of our knowledge in fact signals our interest in only charging the customer for new answers, new value or new formulations. The customers we like to work with feel they are getting an honest, square deal.
Consider your substantive content to be your flag, a unique banner for conveying and packaging your specific brand. It is thus important to find appropriate flagpoles — in the virtual territories that your customers visit — for raising this content high for them to see. Since the role of these flagpoles is to create awareness in potential prospects — who you do not likely know individually or even by group in advance — it makes sense to raise your offerings up on many flagpoles and on the highest flagpoles. Visibility is the object of the approach.
This approach is distinctly not leafletting or cramming links or emails into as many spaces as possible. The idea of substantive marketing is to fly valuable content high enough that desirous potential customers can discover and then inspect the information on their own, and only if they so choose. In this regard, substantive marketing resembles permission marketing [6].
Being visible helps ensure that the needful, questing prospect that you would never have been able to target on your own is able to see and be aware of your offerings. And, since they are seeking information and answers, your collateral needs to be of a similar nature. Solutions and substance are what they are seeking; what you have run up the flagpole should respond to that.
The mindset here is to respect your prospective customers and to allow them to chose to receive and inspect your offerings, but only if they so choose. If flown in the right venues with the right visibility, customers will see your flags and inspect them if they meet their requirements.
Some of the venues at which you can raise your flags include:
The observant reader will have already concluded that each of these venues develops slowly, and therefore raising visibility is generally a slow-and-steady game that requires patience. Start-up vendors backed by venture firms or those looking for quick visibility and cashout will not find this approach suitable. On the other hand, customer prospects looking for answers and self-sustaining solutions are not much interested in flash in the pan vendors, either.
The real drivers for this changing paradigm come from customer prospects. Sophisticated buyers of enterprise IT and instrumental change agents within organizations share most if not all of these characteristics:
More often than not we find our customers to have already installed and used our existing substantive materials for some time before they approach us about further work. They appreciate the tutorial information and have taught themselves much in advance. By the time we engage, both parties are able to cost-effectively focus on what is truly missing and needed and to deliver those answers in a quick way. Re-engagements tend to occur when a next set of gaps or challenges arise.
Though it may sound trite or even unbelievable to those who have not yet experienced such a relationship, the square deal value offered by substantive marketing can really lead to true partnerships and trust between vendor and customer. We experience it daily with our customers, and vice versa. We also think this is the adaptive approach that our new environment demands.
Once prospects learn of our substantive offerings, many may decide independently that what we have is not suitable. Others may simply download and use the information on their own, for which we often never know let alone receive revenue. We are completely fine with this, as shown for three different cases.
First, some of these prospects need no more than what we already have. This increases our user base, increases our visibility and often results in contributions to our forums and documentation.
Then, some of these prospects come to learn they need or want more than what our current offerings provide, leading to two possible forks. In one fork, the second case, they may have sufficient skills internally or with other suppliers to extend the system on their own. Some of this flows back to an improved code base or improved installation or documentation bases.
In the other fork, the third case, they may decide to engage us in tailoring a solution for them. That case is the only one of the three that leads to a direct revenue path.
In all three cases we win, and the customer wins. Maybe enterprise software vendors of decades past rue this reality of lower margins and shared benefits; we agree that the absolute profit potential of substantive marketing is much less. But we gladly accept the more enjoyable work and steady revenue relationships resulting from these changes. We are not engaged in some pollyann-ish altruism here, but in a steely-eyed honest brokering that best serves our own self-interest (and fairly that of the customer, as well).
Great IT product does not come from idle musings or dreamed up functionality. It comes solely and directly from solving customer problems. Only via customers can software be refined and made more broadly usable.
A slipstream of those who have previously become aware and tested our offerings will choose to engage our services. This generally takes the form of an inbound call, where the prospect not only qualifies itself, but also establishes the terms and conditions for the sale. They have chosen to select us; they are fish that have jumped into the boat.
To again quote Peter Drucker, “. . . the aim of marketing is to make selling superfluous. The aim of marketing is to know and understand the customer so well that the product or service fits him and sells itself. Ideally, marketing should result in a customer who is ready to buy. All that should be needed then is to make the product or service available . . .” [8]. This is precisely what I meant earlier about the shift in emphasis from sales to marketing.
Even at this point there may be mismatches in needs and our skills and availabilities. If such is the case, we do not hesitate to say so, and attempt to point the prospect in another direction (from which we also gain invaluable market knowledge). If there is indeed a match, we then proceed to try to find common ground on schedule and budget.
Paradoxically, this square deal and honesty about the readiness and weaknesses of our offerings often leads to forgiveness from our customers. For example, for some time we have lacked automated installation scripts that would make it easier for prospects to install our open semantic framework. But, because of compensating value in other areas, such gaps can be overlooked and tackled later on (indeed, as a current customer is now funding). By not pretending to be everything to everyone, we can offer what we do have without embarrassment and get on with the job of solving problems.
For larger potential engagements, we typically suggest a fixed price initial effort to develop an implementation plan. The interviews and research to support this typical 4- to 6-weeks effort (generally in the $5 K to $10 K range, depending) then result in a detailed fulfillment proposal, with firm tasks, budget and schedule, specific to that customer’s requirements. Just as we respect our prospects’ time and budget, we expect the same and do not conduct these detailed plans without compensation. With respect to fulfillment contracts, we cap contract amount and limit milestone payments to pre-set percentages or time expended, whichever is lower.
This approach ensures we understand the customer’s needs and have budgeted and tasked accordingly. Capped contracts also put the onus on us the contractor to understand our own effort and tasking structures and realities, which leads to better future estimating. For the customer, this approach caps risk and potential exposure, and ensures milestones are being met no matter the time expenditures by us, the contractor. This approach extends our square-deal basis to also embrace risks and payments.
Thus, when customers engage us, they spend almost solely on new functionality specifically tailored to their needs. In doing so, we suggest they agree to release the new developments they fund as open source. We argue — and customers predominantly agree — that they are already benefitting from lower overall costs because other customers have funded sharable, open source before them. We point out that the new customers that follow them will also be independently creating new functionality, to which they will also later benefit.
(This argument does not apply to specific customer data or ontologies, which are naturally proprietary to the customer. Also, if the customer wants to retain intellectual ownership of extensions, we charge higher development fees.)
Once these new developments are completed, they are fed back into a new baseline of valuable content and code. From this new baseline the cycle of substantive marketing can be augmented anew and perpetuated.
All of these points can really be boiled down to three guidelines for how to make substantive marketing effective:
What we are finding — as we continue to refine our understanding of this new paradigm — is that through substantive marketing the fish are finding us and they sometimes jump into the boat. We like our enterprise customers to pre-qualify themselves and already be “sold” once they knock on the door. One never knows when that phone might ring or the email might come in. But when it does, it often results in a collaborative customer as a partner who is a joy to work with to solve exciting new problems.
Reasons for and Implications from Innovation Moving to ConsumersToday, the headlines and buzz for information technologies centers on smartphones, social networks, cloud computing, tablets and everything Internet. Very little is now discussed about IT in the enterprise. This declining trend began about 15 years ago, and has been accelerating over time. Letting the air out of the enterprise IT balloon has some profound reasons and implications. It also has some lessons and guidance related to semantic approaches and technologies and their adoption by enterprises.
One can probably clock the start of enterprise information technology (IT) to the first use of mainframe computers in the early 1950s [1], or sixty years ago. The earliest mainframes were huge and expensive machines that required their own specially air-conditioned rooms because of the heat they generated. The first use of “information technology” as a term occurred in a Harvard Business Review article from 1958 [2].
Until the late 1960s computers were usually supplied under lease, and were not purchased [3]. Service and all software were generally bundled into the lease amount without separate charge and with source code provided. Then, in 1969, IBM led an industry change by starting to charge separately for (mainframe) software and services, and ceasing to supply source code [3]. At about the same time integrated circuits enabled computer sizes to be reduced, with the minicomputers such as from DEC causing a marked expansion in number of potential customers. Enterprise apps became a huge business, with software licensing and maintenance fees achieving a peak of 70% of IT vendor total revenues by the mid-1990s [4]. However, since that peak, enterprise software as a portion of vendor revenues has been steadily eroding.
One of the earliest enterprise applications was in transaction systems and their underlying database management software. The relational database management system (RDBMS) was initially developed at IBM. Oracle, based on early work for the CIA in the late 1970s and its innovation to write in the C programming language, was able to port the RDBMS to multiple operating systems. These efforts, along with those of other notable vendors (most of which like Informix no longer exist), led to the RDBMS becoming more or less the de facto standard for data management within the enterprise by the 1980s. Today Oracle is the largest supplier of RDBMS software globally, and other earlier database system designs such as network databases or object databases fell out of favor [5].
In 1975, the Altair 8800 was introduced to electronics hobbyists as the first microcomputer, followed then by Apple II and the IBM PC in 1981, among others. Rapidly a slew of new applications became available to the individual, including spreadsheets, small databases, graphics programs and word processors. These apps were a boon to individual productivity and the IBM PC in particular brought credibility and acceptance within the enterprise (along with the growth of Microsoft). Novell and local area networks also pointed the way to a more distributed computing future. By the late 1980s virtually every knowledge worker within enterprises had some degree of computer literacy.
The apogee for enterprise software and apps occurred in the 1990s, with whole classes of new applications (most denoted by three-letter acronyms) such as enterprise resource planning (ERP), business intelligence (BI), customer relationship management (CRM), enterprise information systems (EIS) and the like coming to the fore. These systems also began as proprietary software, which resulted in the “stovepiping” or creating of information silos. In reaction and with great market acceptance, vendors such as SAP arose to provide comprehensive, enterprise-wide solutions, though often at high cost and with significant failure rates.
More significantly, the 1990s also saw the innovation of the World Wide Web with its basis in hypertext links on the Internet. Greatly facilitated by the Mosaic Web browser, the basis of the commercial Netscape browser, and the HTML markup language and HTTP transport protocol, millions began experiencing the benefit of creating Web pages and interconnecting. By the mid-1990s, enterprises were on the Web in force, bringing with them larger content volumes, dynamic databases and enterprise portals. The ability for anyone to become a publisher led to a focus and attention on the new medium that led to still further innovations in e-commerce and online advertising. New languages and uses of Web pages and applications emerged, creating a convergence of design, media, content and interactivity. Venture capital and new startups with valuations independent of revenues led to a frenzy of hype and eventually the dot com crash of 2000.
The growth companies of the past 15 years have not had the traditional focus on enterprises, but on the use and development of the Web. From search (Google) to social interactions (Facebook) to media and video (Flickr, YouTube) and to information (Wikipedia), the engines of growth have shifted away from the enterprise.
Meanwhile, the challenges of data integration and interoperability that were such a keen focus going back to initial enterprise computerization remain. Now, however, these challenges are even greater, as we see images, documents (unstructured data) and Web pages, markup and metadata (semi-structured data) become first-class information citizens. What was a challenge in integrating structured data in the 1980s and 1990s via data warehousing, has now become positively daunting for the enterprise with respect to scale and scope.
The paradox is that as these enterprise needs increased, the attractiveness of the enterprise from an IT perspective has greatly decreased. It is these factors we discuss below, with an eye to how Web architecture, design and opportunities may offer a new path through the maze of enterprise information interoperability.
Since 1995 the Gartner Group has been producing its annual Hype Cycle [6]. The clientele for this research is the enterprise, so Gartner’s presentation of what’s hot and what’s hype and what is being adopted is a good proxy for the IT state of affairs in enterprises. These graphs are reproduced below since 2006 (click to expand). Note how many of the items shown are not very specific to the enterprise:
References to architectures and content processing and related topics were somewhat prevalent in 2006, but have disappeared most recently. In comparison to the innovations noted under the History discussion, it appears that the items on Gartner’s radar are more related to consumer applications and uses. We no longer see whole new categories of enterprise-related apps or enterprise architectures.
The kinds of innovations that are being discussed as important to enterprises in the coming year [7,8] tend to mostly leverage existing innovations in other areas or to wrinkle existing approaches. One report from Constellation Research, for example, lists the five core disruptive technologies of social, mobile, cloud, analytics and unified communications [7]. Only analytics could be described as enterprise focused or driven.
And, even in analytics, the kinds of things being promoted are self-service reporting or analysis [8]. In essence, these opportunities represent the application of Web 2.0 techniques to bring reporting or analysis directly to the analyst. Though important and long overdue, such innovations are more derivative than fundamental.
Master data management (MDM) is another touted area. But, to read analyst’s predictions in these areas, it feels like one has stepped into a time warp of technologies and options from a decade ago. When has XML felt like an innovation?
Of course, there is a whole industry of analysts that makes their living prognosticating to enterprises about what to expect from information technologies and how to adopt and embrace them. The general observations — across the board — seem to center on items such as smartphones and mobile, moving to the cloud for software or platforms (SaaS, PaaS), and collaboration and social networks. As I note below, there is nothing inherently wrong or unexciting per se about these trends. But, what does appear true is that the locus of innovation has shifted from the enterprise to consumers or the Internet.
The shift in innovation away from the enterprise has been structural, not cyclical. That means that very fundamental forces are at work to cause this change in innovation focus. It does not mean that innovation has permanently shifted away from the enterprise (organizations), but that some form of countervailing structural changes would need to occur to see a return to the IT focus on the enterprise from prior decades.
I think we can point to seven structural reasons for this shift, many of which interact with one another. While all of them are bringing benefits (some yet to be foreseen) to the enterprise, and therefore are to be lauded, they are not strictly geared to address specific enterprise challenges.
As pundits say, “The Internet changes everything” [9]. For the reasons noted under the history above, the most important cause for the shift in innovation away from the enterprise has been the Internet.
One aspect that is quite interesting is the use of Internet-based technologies to provide “outsourced” enterprise applications hosted on Web servers. Such “cloud computing” leverages the technologies and protocols inherent to the Internet. It shifts hosting, maintenance and upgrade responsibilities for conventional apps to remote providers. Initially, of course, this simply shifts locus and responsibility from in-house to a virtual party. But, it is also the case that such changes will also promote more subtle shifts in collaboration and interaction possibilities. There is also the fact that quick upgrades of underlying infrastructure and application software can also occur.
The implications for existing enterprise IT staff, traditional providers, and licensing and maintenance approaches are profound. The Internet and cloud computing will perhaps have a greater effect on governance, staffing and management than application functionality per se.
The captivating IT-related innovations at present are mobile (smartphones) and their apps, tablets and e-book readers, Internet TV and video, and social networks of a variety of stripes. Somewhat like the phenomenon of when personal computers first appeared, many of these consumer innovations have applicability to the enterprise, though only as a side effect.
It is perhaps instructive to look back at the adoption of PCs in the enterprise to understand the possible effect of these new consumer innovations. Central IT was never able to control and manage the proliferation of personal computers, and only began to understand years later what benefits and new governance challenges they brought. Enterprise leaders will understand how to embrace and extend today’s new consumer technologies for the enterprise’s benefits; laggards will resist to no avail.
The ubiquity of computing will be enormously impactful on the enterprise. The understanding of what makes sense to do on a mobile basis with a small screen and what belongs on the desk or in the office is merely a glimmer in the current conversation. However, in the end, like most of the other innovations noted in this analysis, the enterprise will largely be a reactive player to these innovations. Yes, the implications will be profound, but their inherent basis are not grounded in unique enterprise challenges. Nonetheless, adapting to them and changing business practice will be critical to asserting enterprise leadership.
Ten years ago open source was largely dismissed in the enterprise. About five years ago VCs and others began funding new commercial open source ventures, even while there were still rear guard arguments from enterprises resisting open source. Meanwhile, as the figure to the right shows, open source projects were growing exponentially [10].
The shift to open source in the enterprise, still ongoing, has been rapid. Within 5 years, more than 50% of enterprise software will be open source [11] . According to an article in Fortune magazine last year [12], a Forrester Research survey found that 48% of enterprise respondents were using open source operating systems, and 57% were using open source code. A similar Accenture survey of 300 large public and private companies found that half are committed to open source software, with 38% saying they would begin using open-source software for “mission-critical” applications over the next 12 months.
There are likely many reasons for this shift, including the Internet itself and its basis in open source. Many of the most successful companies of the past 15 years including Amazon, Google, Facebook, and virtually any large Web site has shown excellent performance and scalability building their IT infrastructure around open source foundations. Most of the large, existing enterprise IT vendors, notably including IBM, Oracle, Nokia, Intel, Sun (prior to Oracle), Citrix, Novell (just acquired by Attachmate) and SAP have bought open source providers or have visible support for open source initiatives. Even two of the most vocal proprietary source proponents of the past — HP and Microsoft — have begun to make moves toward open source.
The age of proprietary software based on proprietary standards is dead. The monopoly rents formerly associated with unique, proprietary platforms and large-scale enterprise apps are over. Even where software remains proprietary, it is embracing open standards for data interchange and APIs. Traditional enterprise apps such as content management, business intelligence and ETL, among all others, are being penetrated by commercial open source offerings (as examples, Alfresco, Pentaho and Talend, respectively). The shift to services and new business models appears to be an inexorable force.
Declining profit margins, matched with the relatively high cost of marketing and sales to enterprises, means attention and focus have been shifting away from the enterprise. And with these shifts in focus has come a reduction in enterprise-focused innovation.
It is not unusual to find deployed systems within enterprises as old as thirty years [13]. So long as they work reasonably well, systems once installed — along with their data — tend to remain in operation until their platforms or functionality become totally obsolete. This leads to rather lengthy turnover cycles, and slow development cycles.
Slow cycles in themselves slow innovation. But slow development cycles are also a disincentive to attract the most capable developers. When development tends to focus on maintenance and scripts and more routines of the same nature, the best developers tend to migrate elsewhere (see next).
Another aspect of slow development cycles is the imperative for new enterprise IT to relate to and accommodate legacy systems — again, including legacy data. This consideration is the source of one of the negative implications of a shift away from innovation in the enterprise: the orphaning of existing information assets.
Arguably the emphasis on consumer and Internet technologies means that is where the best developers gravitate. Developing apps for smartphones or working at one of the cool Internet companies or joining a passionate community of open source developers is now attracting the best developers. Open source and Web-based systems also lead to faster development cycles. The very best developers are often the founders of the next generation startups and Web and software companies [14].
While, of course, huge numbers of computer programmers and IT specialists are hired by enterprises each year, the motivations tend to be higher pay, better benefits and more job security. The nature of the work and the bureaucracy and routine of many IT functions require such compensation. And, because of the other shifts noted elsewhere, even the software startups that are able to attract the most innovative developers no longer tend to develop for enterprise purposes.
Computer science students have been declining in industrialized countries for some time and that is the category of slowest growth in IT [14]. Meanwhile, existing IT personnel often have expertise in older legacy systems or have been focused on bug fixes and more prosaic tasks like report writing. Narrow job descriptions and work activities also keep many existing IT personnel from getting exposed to or learning about new trends or innovations, such as the semantic Web.
Declining numbers of new talent, plus declining interest by that talent, combined with (often) narrow and legacy expertise of existing talent, creates a disappointing storm of energy and innovation to address enterprise IT challenges. Enterprises have it within their power to create more exciting career opportunities to overcome these limitations, but unfortunately IT management often also appears challenged to get on top of these structural forces.
Open source and Internet-based systems have reduced the capital necessary for a new startup by an order of magnitude or so over the past decade. It is now quite possible to get a new startup up and running for tens to hundreds of thousands of dollars, as opposed to the millions of years past. This is leading to more startups, more startups per innovator, and quicker startup and abandonment cycles. Ideas can be tried quickly and more easily thrown away [15].
These dynamics are acting to accelerate overall development cycles and to cause a shift in funding structures and funding amounts by VCs and angels. The kind of market and sales development typical for many enterprise sales does not fit well within these dynamics and is a countervailing force for more capital when all trends point the other way.
In short, all of this is saying that money goes to where the returns are, and returns are not of the same basis as decades past in the enterprise sector. Again, this means a hollowing out of innovation for enterprises.
As an earlier reference noted [4], software revenues as a percent of IT vendor revenues peaked in about the mid-1990s. As profitability for these entities began to decline, so did the overall attractiveness of the sector.
As the next chart shows, coincident with the peak in profitability was the onset of a consolidation trend in the enterprise IT vendor sector [16]. The chart below shows that three of the largest IT vendors today — Oracle, IBM and HP — began an acquisition spree in the mid-1990s that has continued until just recently, as many of the existing major players have already been acquired:
Notable acquisitions over this period include: Oracle — PeopleSoft, Siebel Systems, MySQL, Hyperion, BEA and Sun; HP — EDS, 3Com, VeriFone, Compaq, Palm and Mercury Interactive; IBM — Lotus, Rational, Informix, Ascential, FileNet, Cognos and SPSS. Published acquisition costs exceeded $130 billion, mostly for the larger deals. But terms for 75% of the 262 transactions were not disclosed [16]. The total value of these consolidations likely approaches $200 billion to $300 billion.
Clearly, the market is now favoring large players with large service components. This consolidation trend does belie one early criticism of open source v proprietary software: proprietary software is likely to be better supported. In theory this might be true, but vanishing suppliers does not bode well for support either. Over time, we may likely see successful open source projects showing greater longevity than many IT vendors.
This discussion is not a boo-hoo because the heyday of enterprise IT innovation is past. Much of that innovation was expensive, often failed to achieve successful adoption, and promoted walled gardens and silos. As someone who ran companies directly involved in enterprise software sales, I personally do not miss the meetings, the travel, the suits and the 18-month sales cycles.
The enterprise has gained much from outside innovation in the past, from the personal computer to LANs and browsers and the Internet. To be sure, what we are now seeing with mobile phones has more computing power than the original Space Shuttle [17], and continued mashup and social engagement innovations will have unforeseen and manifest benefits for enterprises. I think this is unalloyed goodness.
We can also see innovations based on the Internet such as the semantic Web and its languages and standards to promote interoperability. Breaking these barriers is critically needed by enterprises of the future. Data models such as RDF [18] and open world mindsets that better accommodate uncertainty and breadth of information [19] can only be seen as positive. The leverage that will come from these non-enterprise innovations may in the end prove to be as important as the enterprise-specific innovations of the past.
Yet a shift to Internet and consumer IT innovation leaves some implications. These concerns have to do with the unique demands and needs of enterprises. One negative implication is that a diminishing supplier base may not lead to actual deployments that are enterprise-ready or -responsive.
The first concern relates to quality and operational integrity. There is an immense gulf between ISO 9000 or Six Sigma and, for example, the “good enough” of standard search results on the Web. Consumer apps do not impose the same thresholds for quality as demanded by paying bosses or paying customers. This is not a value judgment; simply a reality. I see it reflected in the quality of tools and code for many new innovations today on the Web.
Proofs-of-concept and “cool” demos work well for academic theses or basic intros to new concepts. The 20% that gets you 80% goes a long way to point the way to new innovation; but the 80% to get to the last 20% is where enterprises bet their money. Unfortunately, in too many instances, that gap is not being filled. The last 20% is hard work, often boring, and certainly not as exciting as the next Big Thing. And, as the trends above try to explicate, there are also diminishing rewards for living in that territory.
A similar and second concern pervades data interoperability. Data interoperability has been the central challenge of enterprise IT for at least three decades. As soon as we were able to interconnect systems and bridge differences in operating systems and data schema, the Holy Grail has been breaking information barriers and silos. The initial attempts with proprietary data warehouses or enterprise-wide ERP systems were wrongly trying to apply closed solutions to inherently open problems. But, now, finally when we have the open approaches and standards in hand for bridging these gaps, the attractiveness of doing so for the enterprise seems to have vanished.
For example, we see demos, tools and algorithms being published all over the place that show promising advances or improvements in the semantic Web or linked data (among other areas; see [20]). Some of these automated techniques sound wonderful, but real systems require the hard slog of review and manual approval. Quality matters. If Technique A, say, shows an improvement over Technique B of 5%, that is worth touting. But even at 98% percent accuracy, we will still find 20,000 errors in a population of 1 million items. Such errors will simply not work in having trains run on time, seats be available on airplanes, or inventory get to their required destinations.
What can work from the standpoint of linkage or interoperability on the Web according to consumer standards will simply not fly for many enterprises. But, where are the rewards for tackling that hard slog?
Another concern is security and differential access. Open Web systems, bless their hearts, do not impose the same access and need to know restrictions as information systems within enterprises. If we are to adopt Web-based approaches to the next-generation enterprise — a position we strongly advocate — then we are also going to need to figure out how to marry these two world views. Again, there appears to be an effort-reward mismatch here.
These observations are not meant to be a polemic, but a statement of more-or-less current circumstances. Since its widescale adoption, the major challenge — and opportunity — of enterprise IT has been how to leverage the value within the enterprise’s existing digital information assets. That challenge is augmented today with the availability of literally a whole world of external digital knowledge. Yet, the energy and emphasis for innovation to address these challenges has seemingly shifted to consumers and away from the enterprise.
Economics abhors a vacuum. I think two responses may be likely to this circumstance. The first is that new vendors will emerge to address these gaps, but with different cost structures and business models. I’d like to think my own firm, Structured Dynamics, is one of these entities. How we are addressing this opportunity and differences in our business model we will discuss at a later time. In any case, any such new player will need to take account of some of the structural changes noted above.
Another response can come from enterprises themselves, using and working the same forces of change noted earlier. Via collaboration and open source, enterprises can band together to contribute resources, expertise and people to develop open source infrastructures and standards to address the challenges of interoperability. We already see exemplars of such responses in somewhat related areas via initiatives such as Eclipse, Apache, W3C, OASIS and others. By leveraging the same tools of collaboration and open data and systems and the Internet, enterprises can band together and ensure their own self-interests are being addressed.
One advantage of this open, collaborative approach is that it is consistent with the current innovation trends in IT. But the real advantage is that it works and is needed. Without it, it is unclear how the enterprise IT challenge — especially in data interoperability — will be met.
Structured Dynamics has been engaged in open source software development for some time. Inevitably in each of our engagements we are asked about the viability of open source software, its longevity, and what the business model is behind it. Of course, I appreciate our customers seemingly asking about how we are doing and how successful we are. But I suspect there is more behind this questioning than simply good will for our prospects.
Besides the general facts that most of us know — of hundreds of thousands of open source projects only a miniscule number get traction — I think there are broader undercurrents in these questions. Even with open source, and even with good code documentation, that is not enough to ensure long-term success.
When open source broke on the scene a decade or so ago [1], the first enterprise concerns were based around code quality and possible “enterprise-level” risks: security, scalability, and the fact that much open source was itself LAMP-based. As comfort grew about major open source foundations — Linux, MySQL, Apache, the scripting languages of PHP, Perl and Python (that is the very building blocks of the LAMP stack) — concerns shifted to licensing and the possible “viral” effects of some licenses to compromise existing proprietary systems.
Today, of course, we see hugely successful open source projects in all conceivable venues. Granted, most open source projects get very little traction. Only a few standouts from the hundreds of thousands of open source projects on big venues like SourceForge and Google Code or their smaller brethren are used or known. But, still, in virtually every domain or application area, there are 2-3 standouts that get the lion’s share of attention, downloads and use.
I think it fair to argue that well-documented open source code generally out-competes poorly documented code. In most circumstances, well-documented open source is a contributor to the virtuous circle of community input and effort. Indeed, it is a truism that most open source projects have very few code committers. If there is a big community, it is largely devoted to documentation and assistance to newbies on various forums.
We see some successful open source projects, many paradoxically backed by venture capital, that employ the “package and document” strategy. Here, existing open source pieces are cobbled together as more easily installed comprehensive applications with closer to professional grade documentation and support. Examples like Alfresco or Pentaho come to mind. A related strategy is the “keystone” one where platform players such as Drupal, WordPress, Joomla or the like offer plug-in architectures and established user bases to attract legions of third-party developers [2].
I think if we stand back and look at this trajectory we can see where it is pointing. And, where it is pointing also helps define what the success factors for open source may be moving forward.
Two decades ago most large software vendors made on average 75% to 80% of their revenues from software licences and maintenance fees; quite the opposite is true today [3]. The successful vendors have moved into consulting and services. One only needs look to three of the largest providers of enterprise software of the past two decades — IBM, Oracle and HP — to see evidence of this trend.
How is it that proprietary software with its 15% to 20% or more annual maintenance fees has been so smoothly and profitably replaced with services?
These suppliers are experienced hands in the enterprise and know what any seasoned IT manager knows: the total lifecycle costs of software and IT reside in maintenance, training, uptime and adaptation. Once installed and deployed, these systems assume a life of their own, with actual use lifetimes that can approach two to three decades.
This reality is, in part, behind my standard exhortation about respecting and leveraging existing IT assets, and why Structured Dynamics has such a commitment to semantic technology deployment in the enterprise that is layered onto existing systems. But, this very same truism can also bring insight into the acceptable (or not) factors facing open source.
Great code — even if well documented — is not alone the mousetrap that leads the world to the door. Listen to the enterprise: lifecycle costs and longevity of use are facts.
But what I am saying here is not really all that earthshaking. These truths are available to anyone with some experience. What is possibly galling to enterprises is two smug positions of new market entrants. The first, which is really naïve, is the moral superiority of open source or open data or any such silly artificial distinctions. That might work in the halls of academia, but carries no water with the enterprise. The second, more cynically based, is to wrap one’s business in the patina of open source while engaging in the “wink-wink” knowledge that only the developer of that open source is in a position to offer longer term support.
Enterprises are not stupid and understand this. So, what IT manager or CIO is going to bet their future software infrastructure on a start-up with immature code, generally poor code documentation or APIs, and definitely no clear clue about their business?
Yet, that being said, neither enterprises nor vendors nor software innovators that want to work with them can escape the inexorable force of open source. While it has many guises from cloud computing to social software or software as a service or a hundred other terms, the slow squeeze is happening. Big vendors know this; that is why there has been the rush to services. Start-up vendors see this; that is why most have gone consumer apps and ad-based revenue models. And enterprises know this, which is why most are doing nothing other than treading water because the way out of the squeeze is not apparent.
The purpose of this three-part series is to look at these issues from many angles. What might the absolute pervasiveness of open source mean to traditional IT functions? How can strategic and meaningful change be effected via these new IT realities in the enterprise? And, how can software developers and vendors desirous of engaging in large-scale initiatives with enterprises find meaningful business models?
And, after we answer those questions, we will rest for a day.
But, no, seriously, these are serious questions.
There is no doubt open source is here to stay, yet its maturity demands new thinking and perspectives. Just as enterprises have known that software is only the beginning of decades-long IT commitments and (sometimes) headaches, the purveyors and users of open source should recognize the acceptance factors facing broad enterprise adoption and reliance.
Open source offers the wonderful prospect of avoiding vendor “lock-in”. But, if the full spectrum of software use and adoption is also not so covered, all we have done is to unlock the initial selection and install of the software. Where do we turn for modifications? for updates? for integration with other packages? for ongoing training and maintenance? And, whatever we do, have we done so by making bets on some ephemeral start-up? (We know how IBM will answer that question.)
The first generation of open source has been a substitute for upfront proprietary licenses. After that, support has been a roll of the dice. Sure, broadly accepted open source software provides some solace because of more players and more attention, but how does this square with the prospect of decades of need?
The perverse reality in these questions is that most all early open source vendors are being gobbled up or co-opted by the existing big vendors. The reward of successful market entry is often a great sucking sound to perpetuate existing concentrations of market presence. In the end, how are enterprises benefiting?
Now, on the face of it, I think it neither positive nor negative whether an early open source firm with some initial traction is gobbled up by a big player or not. After all, small fish tend to be eaten by big fish.
But two real questions arise in my mind: One, how does this gobbling fix the current dysfunction of enterprise IT? And, two, what is a poor new open source vendor to do?
The answer to these questions resides in the concerns and anxieties that caused them to be raised in the first place. Enterprises don’t like “lock-in” but like even less seeing stranded investments. For open source to be successful it needs to adopt a strategy that actively extends its traditional basis in open code. It needs to embrace complete documentation, provision of the methods and systems necessary for independent maintenance, and total lifecycle commitments. In short, open source needs to transition from code to systems.
We call this approach the total open solution. It involves — in addition to the software, of course — recipes, methods, and complete documentation useful for full-life deployments. So, vendors, do you want to be an enterprise player with open source? Then, embrace the full spectrum of realities that face the enterprise.
The actual mantra that we use to express this challenge is, “We’re Successful When We’re Not Needed“. This simple mental image helps define gaps and tells us what we need to do moving forward.
The basic premise is that any taint of lock-in or not being attentive to the enterprise customer is a potential point of failure. If we can see and avoid those points and put in place systems or whatever to overcome them, then we have increased comfort in our open source offerings.
Like good open source software, this is ultimately a self-interest position to take. If we can increase comfort in the marketplace that they can adopt and sustain our efforts without us, they will adopt them to a greater degree. And, once adopted, and when extensions or new capabilities are needed, then as initial developers with a complete grasp on the entire lifecycle challenges we become a natural possible hire. Granted, that hiring is by no means guaranteed. In fact, we benefit when there are many able players available.
In the remaining two parts of this series we will discuss all of the components that make up a total open solution and present a collaboration platform for delivering the methods and documentation portions. We’re pretty sure we don’t yet have it fully right. But, we’re also pretty sure we don’t have it wrong.
I just came across a VC blog pondering the value to a start-up of operating in “Stealth Mode” or not. I’ve amusingly come to the conclusion that all of this — particularly the “stealth” giveaway — is so much marketing hype. When a start-up claims they’re coming out of stealth mode, grab your wallet.
The most interesting and telling example I have of this is Rearden Commerce, which was announced in a breathy cover story in InfoWorld in February 2005 about the company and its founder/CEO Patrick Grady. The company has an obvious “in” with the magazine; in 2001 InfoWorld also carried a similar piece on the predecessor company to Rearden, Talaris Corporaton.
According to a recent Business Week article, Rearden Commerce and its predecessors reaching back to an earlier company called Gazoo founded in 1999 have raised $67 million in venture capital. While it is laudable the founder has reportedly put his own money into the venture, this venture through its massive funding and high-water mark of 80 employees or so hardly qualifies as “stealth.”
As early as 2001 with the same technology and business model, this same firm was pushing the “stealth” moniker. According to an October 2001 press release:
“The company, under its stealth name Gazoo, was selected by Red Herring magazine as one of its ‘Ten to Watch’ in 2001.” [emphasis added]
Even today, though no longer using the active name Talaris Corporation, it has close to 115,000 citations on Yahoo! Notable VCs such as Charter Ventures, Foundation Capital, JAFCo and Empire Capital have backed it through its multiple incubations.
Holmes Report, a marketing company, provides some insight into how the earlier Talaris was spun in 2001:
“The goal of the Talaris launch was to gain mindshare among key business and IT trade press and position Talaris as a ‘different kind of start-up’ with a multi-tiered business model, seasoned executive team and tested product offering.”
[Hmmm; grind me a pound!]
The Holmes Report documents the analyst firms and leading journals and newspapers to which it made outreach. Actually, this outreach is pretty impressive. Good companies do the same all of the time and that is to be lauded. What is to be questioned, however, is how many “stealths” a cat can have. Methinks this one is one too many.
“Stealth” thus appears to be code for an existing company of some duration that has had disappointing traction and now has new financing, a new name, new positioning, or all of the above. So, interested in a start-up that just came out of stealth mode? Let me humbly suggest standard due diligence.
This Friday brown bag leftover was first placed into the AI3 refrigerator on October 13, 2005. No changes have been made to the original posting, except the [grinding] bit.
However, as of last year, Rearden had upped its VC funding to $240 million (can we spell multiple ?). Today, it is now focused on the travel industry. Fly me to the moon!
